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IMPORTANT LATE DECISIONS
CARRIERS-NEGLIGENCE-PASSENGER's FAILURE TO WARN OF
DANGER AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-The plaintiff was
awarded damages against a taxi-cab company for injuries sus-
tained when the driver of the cab in which she was a passenger
proceeded in the wrong direction along a one-way street and
collided with an automobile traveling in the opposite direction.
Defendant company answered with a general denial and an
allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff. To establish the latter, defendant brought out the fact
that the plaintiff did not protest or endeavor to prevent the
driver from violating the traffic rule by driving in a prohibited
direction, Held, that while the plaintiff as a passenger may
have participated in the illegal use of the street in question,
thus becoming trespasser as against the driver of the other
vehicle involved, yet, since such participation was not due to
her act, or omission, nor assented to by her, the defense of
contributory negligence was not affirmatively established; that
she and the defendant, acting by its employee, were not, as
to each other, in pari delicto. Rea v. Checker Taxi Co., 172
N. E. 612 (Mass. 1930).
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts was, under the facts, a proper one, but some
portions of its decision are so unhappily expressed as to be
misleading and leave one in doubt as to the correctness of at
least one of its legal assumptions. For instance, the court says
that the plaintiff and defendant, as to each other, are not in
pari delicto, but indicates that under the facts the plaintiff
would be guilty of contributory negligence, had the action been
by plaintiff against the operator of the other vehicle. In this
connection a prior case decided by this court is cited.' There
the plaintiff, who was a passenger in an automobile driven in
the wrong direction down a one-way street, sought to recover
damages for injuries resulting from a collision with another
automobile, from the driver of the latter vehicle. The court
held that even though the plaintiff was merely a passenger in
the car that was driven contrary to the ordinance or traffic
rule, he could not recover, for the highway was used illegally
and he was participating in this use, and the illegal use of said
highway was not a mere condition of an accident, but a con-
tributory cause of such accident. Nowhere in this case, how-
ever, does the court give its holding a secure legal foundation
by showing any lack of care on the part of the plaintiff, who
I Widronak v. Lord, 168 N. E. 799 (Mass. 1929).
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was not shown to have exercised control or to have failed to
show ordinary and reasonable diligence for his own safety and
that of others. The doctrine of pari delicto indulged in by
the court does not impress us as a sound legal assumption.
For, to bar a recovery by plaintiff, such a defendant would
be put to the same proof as defendant herein was, namely, show-
ing that plaintiff was in control of the taxi-cab or that she
omitted to warn the driver of the approaching danger after
she knew or reasonably should have known it existed, and that
such omission was the proximate cause of the collision. The
standard for gauging negligence would be the usual test of the
care which one of ordinary prudence would exercise under
similar circumstances. However, as regards the principal hold-
ing of the court relative to negligence of passengers in com-
mon carriers in failing to notify the driver of impending
danger, it is orthodox and consistent with the common law rules
of contributory and imputed negligence. 2 It is the duty of
the carrier to use all necessary precautions to carry the passen-
ger safely to his destination and no duty rests upon the
passenger to warn the driver of impending dangers. This is
solely the driver's duty.3 If a person rightfully entrusts his
person to the care of the owner of an automobile without any
voice as to how the vehicle shall be operated, the owner owes to
him the duty of exercising ordinary care for his safety in
the driving of the vehicle. 4
CRIMINAL LAw-SEPARATION OF JURY-PROPRIETY OF PER-
MITTING WOMEN JURORS TO SEPARATE DURING DELIBERATION
FOR PURPOSE OF SLEEPING.-In a trial of the defendant under
indictment for violation of the Eighteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, a mixed jury, deliberating on
a verdict, were unable to come to an agreement by 11:45 o'clock
at night. The court therefore directed that the women jurors
be taken to a hotel in custody of a woman bailiff. They were
kept in a room in the designated hotel by themselves and the
men were kept by themselves. The defendant contended that
the separation of jurors amounted to an acquittal. Held, where
mixed jury fails to arrive at verdict court may, where no
accommodations are provided by county, direct women members
to separate from the men to be taken for the night to a hotel
2 0'Tier v. Sell, 252 N. Y. 400; Baker v. Elebash, 220 Ala. 198;
Graber v. Cormack et al., 148 Atl. 156 (N. J. Misc. R. 1929); Helms
v. Bluhm, 200 Wis. 321; Freeman v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R. Co.,
Inc., 149 Atl. 40 (N. J. Misc. R. 1930); Billingsley v. McCormick Trans-
fer Co., 58 N. D. 921; Bullard v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 226
Mass. 262.
3 Reitz v. Yellow Cab Co., 248 111. App. 287.
4 Warput v. Reading Coal Co., 250 Ill. App. 450.
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in custody of woman bailiff. State v. Murphy, 232 N. W. 335
(Minn. 1930).
Every man is entitled to a fair and impartial trial by a jury
of his peers. That this guarantee, included in most state
constitutions, be enforced to the letter the jury must continue
impartial and unbiased until after the verdict is rendered, and
one of the means of maintaining this impartiality is by refusing
to allow the jury to separate from each other, or mingle with
the balance of the community after it has been sworn.5 The
ancient rule was that once the jury was sworn, whether in a
civil or criminal case, it could not be permitted to separate
until they had agreed upon their verdict.6 The rule has been
relaxed, however, so that today, a separation before the cause
is submitted to the jury for verdict is permitted in both civil7
and misdemeanor cases." But the courts are still somewhat
divided as to the rule of permitting separation during trial in
cases of felonies less than capital. In many states in such cases
it is held that the jury may, in the discretion of the judge, be
permitted to separate.9 In some states separation is provided
for by statute.' 0 In other states the rule is more stringent
and separation will not be permitted." In most states holding
this way, however, it is held that the verdict will not be dis-
turbed where it is affirmatively shown that the prisoner has
not been prejudiced by the separation. 12 But even where the
more liberal rule exists it is sometimes held that if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the separation of the jury
has given rise to any improper practice or prejudicial miscon-
duct the verdict will be set aside.13 In capital cases it is gener-
ally held that a separation before the cause has been submitted
to the jury will be ground for new trial.14 As a rule, however,
no improper separation occurs where the jury separate during
adjournments of court if they are accompanied by sworn
officers, and unless some improper communication is had with
the juror, the verdict will not in such a case be disturbed. 15
But if the jurors in a capital case leave the custody of the
sworn officer during an adjournment it will be error for which
5 McLain v. State, 18 Tenn. 240.
6 State v. Miller, 1 Dev. & B. 508.
7 Stancell ex'r. v. Kenan et a]., 33 Ga. 56.
8 Rex v. Kinnear, 2 Barn. & AId. 462.
9 Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72; Commonwealth v. Costello, 128 Mass.
88; Sutton v. People, 145 Ill. 279.
10 State v. Gillick, 10 Ia. 98; Caw v. People, 3 Neb. 357.
11 State v. Sherbourne, Dudley (Ga.) 28.
12 Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341.
13 State v. Madoil, 12 Fla. 151.
14 People v. Shafer, 1 Utah 260; State v. Desmond and E. &
0. Connor, 5 La. Ann. 398.
15 State v. Cucuel, 31 N. J. L. 249; Crockett v. State, 52 Wis. 211.
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a new trial will be granted if there be the slightest suspicion
of abuse,16 although the mere separation alone will not be
ground for new trial."7 But in some states misconduct and
abuse will always be presumed in a capital case upon a separa-
tion of the jury, and it must be shown affirmatively by the
prosecution there was none.1 8 A necessary temporary separa-
tion will not be considered a technical separation, 9 unless there
has been some possibility of tampering with the jury. Even
a single word by one not a juror with a juror out of hearing
of an officer during an innocent separation may constitute a
technical separation,2 0 though where it is shown a conversation
is innocent it may not be a ground for reversal.2  The rules
are more strict with regard to separation of a jury after they
have retired to consider their verdict, and in civil as well as
criminal cases the jury must be kept together in charge of a
sworn officer until they have agreed on their verdict.2 2  But if
a juror does separate without leave, after the cause has been
submitted to the jury in a civil case, while it will be considered
misbehavior on the part of the juror for which he may be pun-
ished,2 3 it is an almost universal rule that such separation is
not of itself sufficient ground for a new trial where there is
no other misconduct operating to the party's prejudice. 24  The
common law rule in felony cases was that the jury, after
cause was submitted to them, were to be "kept together without
meat, drink, fire, or candle" till they were agreed. 25  While
the rule is not so strict at the present time, the general rule is
that the jury cannot be permitted to separate after the cause
has been submitted to them until they are agreed. 26 But in
most states so holding, such separation is not ground for a new
trial in felony cases less than capital where it is affirmatively
shown that there was no improper communication, directly or
indirectly;27 although in some states misconduct will not be
16 Jumpertz v. People, 21 Ill. 375; Embry v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 488.
17 People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 26; Reins v. People, 30 Ill. 256.
1s State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 554; State v. Prescott, 7 N. H. 287;
State v. Dolling, 37 Wis. 396.
19 People v. Lee, 17 Cal. 76; Neal v. State, 64 Ga. 272; State v.
O'Brien, 7 R. 1. 336.
20 State v. Harris, 12 Nev. 414.
21 Thomas v. Commonwealth, 180 Ky. 228.
22 Sargent v. Ohio, 11 Ohio 472.
23 Downer v. Baxter, 30 Vt. 474.
24 Brandin v. Grannis & Wife, 1 Conn. 402, note; Armleder v. Lieber-
man, 33 Ohio St. 77; Alexander v. Dunn, 5 Ind. 123.
25 Co. Litt. 227 b.
26 Organ v. State, 26 Miss. 78; State v. Populus, 12 La. Ann. 710;
Parker v. State, 18 Ohio St. 88; State v. Parrant, 16 Minn. 157; Wil-
liams v. State, 45 Ala. 57.
27 Daniel v. State, 56 Ga. 653; People v. Adams, 143 Cal. 208; State v.
West, 11 Ida. 157; See Ann. Cas. 1914A p. 738.
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presumed where it is not alleged or shown that there was such
misconduct or opportunity for misconduct. 28  But even after
cause is submitted in a case of a felony less than capital it
would seem proper for a juror to separate if he is in custody of
a sworn officer and nothing is said to or by him or in his
presence about the case. 29 In capital cases th e rule is the same
after the cause has been submitted to the jury as before, that
the jury should not be allowed to separate under any circum-
stances where harm could possibly come to the defendant from
the separation.30 Thus in Minnesota where the statute forbade
that the jurors separate after the jury is charged in a trial for
a capital offense, it was held ground for a new trial where the
court permitted the jurors to go at large for five minutes after
being charged.3 ' A necessary separation, however, would, even
in a capital case, seem to be proper after the cause has been
submitted to the jury when the jurors are in charge of a sworn
officer at all times and no communication is had.3 2 In the
principal case subject to discussion the men and women were
both in custody of sworn officers and the decision is directly
supported by decisions in other states. The facts were almost
identical in an Iowa case where, after deliberating until 12:30
o'clock the next morning, the women jurors- retired across the
hall from the men, a bailiff standing guard outside of both
rooms. 3 3 Although the case under discussion is not a capital
case, the rule in such a case would be the same. 34 But where
one juror retires to a room separate from the others and not
accompanied by an officer it has been held ground for reversal, 35
although a contrary holding resulted under similar circum-
stances in a murder case in Texas. 36 Minnesota has a statute
providing that the jury shall be kept together until an agree-
ment is reached, but there is a proviso relating to separate
accommodations for women jurors, although there is no men-
tion that the proviso would apply after the jury had retired
to deliberate. In view of the general trend of opinions, however,
the result would undoubtedly have been the same without a
statute on the subject. As to the defendant's contention that
the separation amounted to an acquittal, it will suffice to say
28 State v. Turner and Reid, 25 La. Ann. 573; State v. Wart, 51 Ia.
587; Jack v. State, 26 Tex. 1; Territory v. Hexter, 3 Mont. 206.
29 State v. Jones, 7 Nev. 1036; State v. Bowman, 45 Ia. 418.
30 Waller v. People, 209 Ill. 284.
31 State v. Parrant, 16 Minn. 157.
32Waller v. People, 209 Ill. 284; People v. Bonney, 19 Cal. 426.
33 State v. Albery, 197 Ia. 538.
34Adktns v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 385; Elkins v. State, 233 Pac.
491 (Okla. 1925).
35 State v. Pascal, 147 La. 634.
36 Wood v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 187.
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that no cases are to be found holding that a separation ever
amounted to more than ground for new trial.
CRIMINAL LAw-TRIAL--RIGHT OF DEFENDANT PLEADING NOT
GUILTY To FELONY CHARGE TO WAIVE JURY TRLn.-Man-
damus proceeding to command the judge of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, an ex-officio judge of the Criminal Court,
to expunge from the Criminal Court records the proceeding
whereby one Weinberg, having been charged with rape,
arraigned, and having pleaded not guilty, waived a jury trial,
and the judge who heard the testimony entered judgment of
not guilty. It was alleged in the petition for a writ of man-
damus that the judge had neither authority to permit the
waiver of a jury trial nor jurisdiction to hear and determine
the cause upon such a waiver, and that the proceedings were
void. Held, the defendant in a criminal prosecution on charge
of felony may, on a plea of not guilty, waive a jury trial.
People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 172 N. E. 722 (Ill. 1930).
Most state constitutions make no provision regarding waiver
of jury in criminal cases. Whether the courts are empowered
to try felony charges without a jury is, therefore, largely a
question of construction. The constitutionality of waiver ;will
depend on the nature, purpose and historical foundation of the
constitutional safeguard of jury trial.37 Hence, in construing
a constitution, the courts are influenced by one of three theories
concerning the defendant's right to waive jury trial.3 8 Under
the first, jury trial is merely a personal privilege designed for
the benefit of the accused and as such it may be waived.39 So,
adherents to this theory permit waiver in felony cases. 40 By the
second, it is said that no provision is made for any other kind
of tribunal for the trial of cases than a jury as constituted at
common law and so its proper constitution is jurisdictional and
cannot be waived.41 However, the recent federal case of Patton
v. United States4 2 permitted waiver in felony cases under this
theory, after having found no evidence that trial by jury in
criminal cases was regarded as a structure of government in
English and Colonial jurisprudence antedating the constitution.
The third theory, which invariably is mentioned in federal de-
37Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. Law Rev.
700.
38 State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142.
39 State v. Sackett, 39 Minn. 69; Schick v. U. S., 195 U. S. 65.
40 Patton v. U. S., 281 U. S. 276.
41 Low v. U. S., 169 Fed. 86; In re Dawson, 20 Idaho 178; State v.
Williams et al., 195 lowa 374; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172;
Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761; State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664;
State v. Hirsch, 91 Vt. 330; Wartner v. State, 102 Ind. 51.
42 281 U. S. 276.
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cisions denying the right to waive a jury trial, is that the public
has an interest in the protection of the accused from trial by
other than customary methods, even though it be against the
will of the accused.43 Since its basis in the 18th century fear
of arbitrary magistracy has disappeared, it would seem that its
use should be avoided in modern practice and theory.44 These
theories receive no application in states whose constitutional
provisions relating to jury trial contain language which is per-
emptory and mandatory as is the case in Louisiana, 4 5 New
York,46 North Carolina,4 7 and Oklahoma;4s nor do they receive
application in states whose legislatures have enacted statutory
provisions on jury trial which are mandatory in form as in
Arkansas, 45 Rhode Island,50 and Vermont.51 The constitutions
of California, 52 Idaho,53 Montana,5 4 and Vermont, 55 give spe-
cific grants of authority for waiver of jury trial in criminal
proceedings less than felony, while the constitution of the state
of Virginia,56 contains the same provisions in substance, thus
presenting a positive reference that jury trial cannot be waived
in felony cases. Iowa,5 7 Massachusetts,58 Missouri,5 9 Nebraska,' 0
New York,6 1 Ohio,62 Pennsylvania,6 3 Texas,64 Virginia,65 and
Wisconsin,66 are states having no statutory provisions on the
subject of jury trial, and their courts in adopting the public
interest theory, have held that one charged with a felony can-
43 State v. Thompson, 104 La. 167; State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403;
State v. Simons, 61 Kan. 752; Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761;
Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128.
44 Extent of Valid Waiver of Criminal Procedure, 25 Harvard Law
Rev. 179.
45 State v. Jackson, 106 La. 189; State v. Thompson, 104 La. 167.
46,Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128.
47 State v. Stewart, 89 N. C. 563; State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749; State
v. Rogers, 162 N. C. 656.
48 In re McQuown, 19 Okla. 347.
49 Bond v. State, 17 Ark. 290.
50 State v. Battey, 32 R. I. 475.
51 State v. Hirsch, 91 Vt. 330.
52 Constitution of the State of California, (as amended and in force
January 1, 1929), Art. I, sec. 7.
53 Constitution of the State of Idaho of 1890, Art. I, sec. 7.
54 Constitution of the State of Montana, Art. III, sec. 23.
55 Constitution of the State of Vermont, Ch. 1, Art. X.
56 Constitution of the State of Virginia, Art. I, sec. 8.
57 State v. Rea, 126 Iowa 65.
5s Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172.
59 State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470.
6OMichaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761.
61 People v. Cosmos, 205 N. Y. 91.
62 Craig v. State, 49 Ohio St. 415.
63 Commonwealth ex rel. Ross v. Egan, 281 Pa. 251.
64 Jones v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. App. 303.
65 Mays v. The Commonwealth, 82 Va. 550.
66 State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664.
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not waive his right to jury trial, or at least cannot confer
jurisdiction to proceed without a jury. Illinois has consistently
denied waiver in felony cases 67 prior to the case now under
consideration, on the theory that jury trial cannot be waived
so as to confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The
instant Illinois case is evidence of a distinct tendency, especially
in more recent years in decisions of courts under constitutional
and statutory provisions not mandatory in form, to uphold
waiver on the view that jury trial is a privilege, s though a
majority of the courts in the country still deny to the defendant
accused of a felony upon a plea of not guilty, the right to waive
a trial by jury.
CRIMINAL LAw-VENUE-PROOF OF VENUE BY CIROUMSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE.-The defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree on a charge of killing one Lena Walsh in Poinsett
County, Arkansas. The evidence shows the body of a woman
was found a short distance from Black Oak Road in Poinsett
County, about one hundred yards inside of the Poinsett County
line. A witness who lived near the St. Francis River at Marked
Tree in Poinsett County, testified that she heard cries and
moans of a woman on the night of the murder, and that the
noise was located between her house and the river bank, and
came, she judged, a distance of about two city blocks. Other
witnesses testified that on the night of the murder they heard
pistol shots in the direction of the river from Marked Tree.
Defendant claimed the venue was not proved. Held, that
venue may be established like any other fact, without direct
evidence that the offense was committed in the County charged
in the indictment. Walker v. State, 30 S. W. (2nd) 819 (Ark.
1930).
Venue means the county wherein a cause is to be tried.
Originally, the jury were but witnesses to prove or disprove
the allegations of the parties; hence, every case had to be tried
by a jury of the vicinage, because they were presumed to have
personal knowledge of the parties as well as of the facts. The
ancient rule survives unless statutory provisions to the contrary
have been made, and a criminal is answerable, therefore, only
in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed. The question
of venue still is considered so important that if it is not prop-
erly proved, prosecution will fail, because the courts cannot
properly take jurisdiction of the case before it. Under the
67 Harris v. People, 128 Ill. 585; Morgan v. People, 136 Ill. 161.
68 State v. Shearer, 27 Ariz. 311; State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349;
Murphy v. State, 97 Ind. 579; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172;
State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142; Edwards v. State, 45 N. J. L. 419.
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common law it was necessary that someone testify in so many
words as to the place where the offense was committed. The
courts in most states, however, have allowed the question of
venue to be proved by circumstantial evidence from all the
circumstances introduced. 69 The law in Illinois is well settled
that venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence and it is
not necessary that someone testify in terms as to the place
where the offense was committed for the purpose of establishing
venue."O The Supreme Court of Illinois in the People v. Alle-
gretti,7 1 said, "Venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
'It is not necessary that someone testify, in so many words,
to the place where the offense was committed, but it is sufficient
if the evidence, as a whole leaves no reasonable doubt as to the
act upon which an indictment is based having been committed
at the place laid in the indictment.' 72 'The venue of an offense
may be proven like any other fact in a criminal case. It need
not be established by positive testimony nor in the words of the
information, but if from the facts appearing in evidence, the
only rational conclusion which can be drawn is that the offense
was committed in the county alleged, it is sufficient.' 73 The
evidence shows that the offense occurred in Chicago, Cook
County, and that the city is a large one; that the Yellow Cab
Company is an Illinois corporation. We think it is clear from
the entire record that the offense occurred in Cook County,
Illinois, rather than Cook County in some other state." The
Iowa Supreme Court in a rape case said that evidence that the
child lived with her parents, that her father was a farmer whose
residence was the city of Sheldon, Carroll township, and had
been for 22 years, and that the transaction complained of
occurred at his home, was sufficient to warrant the finding of the
jury that the act was committed in the county given in the
indictment.7 4 Proof of venue is a fact which belongs exclusively
69 Grayson v. United States, 272 Fed. 553; Pounds v. State, 15 Ala.
App. 223; Quayle v. State, 19 Ariz. 91; People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App.
333; Morakes.v. State, 158 Ga. 114; Jackson v. State, 187 Ind. 694;
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 568; State v. Frost, 160 Minn. 317;
State v. Palmer, 281 Mo. 525; State v. Woods, 54 Mont. 193; Ward
v. State, 13 Okl. Cr. 81; City of Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403;
Kellar v. State, 174 Wis. 67; McFetridge v. State, 32 Wyo. 185; Allen
v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 416; West v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747;
State v. McDonie, 89 W. Va. 185; People v. Golub, 333 Ill. 554; Ussery
v. State, 154 Miss. 704.
70Weinberg v. People, 208 Ill. 15; Sullivan v. People, 122 Ill. 385;
People v. McIntosh, 242 Ill. 602; People v. Shaw, 300 Ill. 451; People
v. Golub, 333 111. 554.
71 People v. Allegretti, 291 II. 364.
72 Quotation from Porter v. People, 158 Ill. 370.
7, Quotation from Weinecke v. State, 34 Neb. 14.
74 State v. Meyer, 135 Ia. 507.
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to the province of the jury and with it the court has no possible
concern.75
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUNISHMENT-SENTENCE OF BANISH-
MENT AS VIOLATING CONSTITUTION.-The defendant was con-
victed of a violation of the liquor law and sentenced to pay a
fine of $500 and costs of $500. In addition the sentence pro-
vided he should leave the state within thirty days, not to return
for a probationary period of five years. The defendant brought
error on the ground the sentence violated section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States,
and paragraphs 9, 15 and 16 of Article 2 of the Constitution of
the State of Michigan.7 6  Held, a sentence of banishment of
accused from the state is erroneous and opposed to public policy.
Reversed and remanded for a legal sentence. People v. Baum,
231 N. W. 95 (ifich. 1930).
Banishment is not a cruel and unusual punishment.7 7 The
United States as a sovereign and independent nation has the
right to exclude or expel aliens or any class of alien absolutely
or upon certain conditions.78 On the ground that the individual
states are not independent, supreme sovereignties in regard to
those matters delegated by the people to the federal govern-
ment, the court in the instant case held that the states have no
right to punish by banishment. To quote the court, "To permit
one state to dump its convicted criminals into another would
entitle the state believing itself injured thereby to exercise its
police and military power in the interests of its own peace,
safety, and welfare, to repel such an invasion. It would tend
to incite dissention, provoke retaliation, and disturb that funda-
mental equality of political rights among the several states
which is the basis of the union itself. Such a punishment is
not authorized by statute and is impliedly prohibited by public
policy." In this the court is sustained by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, which said, "We do not recognize the
circuit judge as possessing any right to impose such a sentence
as is involved in the perpetual banishment of the defendant
from the state set out in the sentence.'' 79 Banishment did not
originate in England as a sentence for punishment, but was
voluntary-the accused party fled to a sanctuary, confessed
75 State v. Nettles, 41 La. Ann. 323.
76 Paragraph 15 of Article 2 of the Michigan Constitution is equiva-
lent to the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
77 Legarda v. Valdez, 1 Philippine 146; The People v. Potter, 1 Park
Cr. R. 47.
78 Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698.
79 State v. Baker, 58 S. C. 111.
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his crime and took an oath to leave the kingdom, not to return
without permission 8 0  This was known as abjuration, and
while this was later abolished in England, it became customary
to grant pardons on condition the accused would leave the
country for a term, the original sentence being inflicted in
case of a violation. 8' Conditional pardons are recognized in
this country 2 and in several instances in the United States,
banishment has been made a condition to pardon by state
governors.8 3 The same considerations were before the court of
South Carolina in 1829 in a case of permanent banishment from
the state, and the court remarked, "It is said, moreover, that
the substitution of banishment is illegal, as it has the effect of
casting our convicts on our sister states, or foreign nations,
and is, therefore, void . . . . We have no law which pro-
hibits it; nor is there anything in the Constitution of the United
States, or the law of nations, which forbids us to cast off
offensive members of society. A foreign state, it is true, is
not bound to receive and entertain them; and if they forbid
it, his entry into their territory is a violation of their laws, but
one for which he alone is responsible." '  It does not appear
from the case of State v. Baker,s 5 heretofore quoted, that any
change in the policy of the state had taken place since the
earlier cases, and if the reasons given by the Michigan court
in the instant case establish a proposition that such a sentence
is impliedly against public policy, certainly the same should
apply to make the pardon of a governor, conditioned on banish-
ment from the state, against public policy. While it is true
that a pardon conditioned on banishment is not equivalent to
a sentence of banishment, the rights of other states axe violated
either way. In spite of the conditional pardon the banished
criminal may be an undesirable. On the ground of public policy
alone, therefore, the cases are not to be reconciled, but perhaps
we may charge the change in the attitude of the courts to the
submergence of the theory of state sovereignty under the theory
that the states are, after all, integral parts of one sovereign.
CORPORATIONS-DIRECTORS--STOCKHOLDERS' RIGHT TO FILL
VACANCIES IN BOARD OF DIRECTORS.-A board of directors, con-
sisting originally of three members, was reduced to two upon
the resignation of one director after the disposing of his share
80 4 Bi. Com. 333.
81 1 Chitty Cr. L. 773.
82 The United States v. Wilson, 1 Pet. 156.
83 The People v. Potter, 1 Park Cr. R. 47; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey
283; The People v. Pease, 3 Johns. Cas. 333; State v. Mary Fuller, 1
McCord 178.
84 State v. Smith, 1 Bailey 283.
8558 S. C. 111.
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holdings. The remaining members of the board, because they
were antagonistic toward one another, were unable to come to
an agreement. A special stockholders meeting was called to
elect another director, and the defendant was duly elected by a
majority of all the votes cast. The relator, one of the original
directors, contested the validity of the election and instituted a
quo warranto proceeding to oust the newly elected director,
and judgment of ouster was granted. Held, statute authorizing
directors to fill vacancies in board is contrary to constitutional
provision granting exclusive right to stockholders, and there-
fore invalid. Reversed and remanded. People ex rel. Weber
v. Cohn, 339 II. 121 (1930).
This case involves solely a question of the construction of
Article XI, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution and the validity
of paragraph 5 of section 21 of the Corporation Act,8 6 the
former providing that in all elections for directors or managers
of incorporated companies every stockholder shall have the
right to vote in person or by proxy the number of shares owned
by him or to cumulate the same, "and such directors or mana-
gers shall not be elected in any other manner;" the latter
providing that the directors of a corporation shall "fill all
vacancies which may happed in the board of directors caused
by death, resignation, or otherwise, until the next annual meet-
ing of the stockholders." Where the question is one of construc-
tion, constitutions as well as statutes should be read and
understood according to the most natural and obvious import
of the-language used,87 great consideration being given to that
construction which has been long acquiesced in where there is
any apparent ambiguity in the phraseology11 Where a con-
struction has been placed upon a statute by those charged with
its execution and application, such construction shall be entitled
to great weight and should not be overruled unless clearly
erroneous,8 9 the greatest weight being given to constructions of
the legislature itself.9 0 The Illinois Supreme Court has already
held ."the constitution does not derive its force from the con-
vention which framed, but from the people who ratified it,
and the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.9 1 Conse-
quently, the words employed should be given the meaning which
they bear in ordinary use among the people, except where the
meaning of a word used is established by statute or by judicial
86 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. (1929), Ch. 32, par. 21.
87 People v. Stevenson, 281 Ill. 17.
8s People v. The Board of Supervisors of La Salle County, 100 Ill.
495; Nye v. Forman,. 215 Il1. 285.
89 Mathews v. Shores, 24 Ill. 27; Whittemore v. People, 227 Ill. 453.
90 Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327; Boehm v. Hertz, 182 Ill. 154.
91 City of Beardstown et al. v. City of Virginia et al., 76 Ill. 34.
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construction. 2 After reviewing the rules regarding construc-
tion, the court in this case held that the wording of the
constitution in providing that "such directors or managers shall
not be elected in any other manner" was conclusive, and the
statute which provided for the election of directors in a manner
different from that prescribed by the constitution was conse-
quently invalid. In so holding, the court affirmed and gave
effect to an opinion written several years ago by the then
attorney-general.9 3 The court in determining a question of
construction is obliged to construe an act in favor of its consti-
tutionality and validity, unless satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that is invalid,94 but where the meaning of the statute
is plain and the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that it contravenes the constitution, it is the court's duty to
hold the statute unconstitutional.9 5 The precise question pre-
sented by this case has never before been judicially determined
in this state, but in reaching a decision the court has followed
the precedent established in a series of cases involving the
rights of stockholders, which hold variously that a contract
whereby certain bondholders attempted to exercise the right to
vote at stockholders' meetings was invalid ;96 that while a stock-
holder may permit his stock to be voted by a trustee under a
voting trust, he cannot deprive himself or be deprived of the
right to vote the stock;97 that a corporation cannot deprive
preferred stockholders of their constitutional right to vote for
directors;98 and that a by-law depriving any stockholder of
his right to vote is invalid.99 The decision of the court in
the instant case has been criticizedo ° on the ground that it
was unnecessary to declare the statute unconstitutional and
that by so doing a burden has been placed upon all Illinois
corporations which will, of necessity, hamper them in their
operations and create unnecessary expenditure and incon-
venience by requiring a special meeting of stockholders every
time a vacancy occurs in the board of directors. At first sight
this criticism would appear to be just. However, when the
arguments offered are considered and weighed in the light of
the established principles of the law, the criticism does not
appear to have any basis in such established principles. On
92 Burke v. Snively, 208 111. 328.
93 Opinions of Edward J. Brundage, Attorney-General, #11427, Dec.
29, 1922.
94People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28.
95 People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 294 111. 204.
96 Durkee v. People, 155 Ill. 354.
97 Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170.
98 People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300.
99 Hall v. Woods, 325 Ill. 114.
100 Michigan Law Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Nov. 1930), p. 109.
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the contrary, it appears to be founded upon questions of con-
venience to the directors, reposing of confidence by the stock-
holders in such directors, and others of similar idealistic rather
than legal nature. Where the interests of a corporation are
concerned, those interests are the interests of the stockholders,
who, in turn, are the corporation. The fact that the stock
holders have sufficient confidence in this man or that man to
elect him to the board of directors does not imply that they
would repose a similar confidence in a third party of the choos-
ing of either or both of these men. Indeed, it is conceivable
that such a person, while bearing the endorsement of all the
remaining members of the board, might, before the regular
annual stockholders' meeting, bring about irreparable injury
to the corporation and to the interests of the stockholders, if
the stockholders are deprived of the right reserved to them by
the constitution-a reservation they must impliedly have had
in mind when electing the original members of the board. The
criticism further argues that the constitution could have been
construed to reserve to the stockholders the power to elect
directors at the regular annual meeting only, but this the court
had no power to do, because the constitution specifically states
that "in all elections for directors or managers," each stock-
holder shall have the right to vote, and where the meaning of
both the constitution and a statute are plain and the latter
contravenes the former, it is the duty of the court to hold the
statute unconstitutional.' 0 l
INJUNCTION-DEFENSE,---INcoNVENIENCE TO DEFENDANT.-
The defendant, Columbus Theater, Inc., owner of property
adjoining complainant's, erected a theater building. Complain-
ing that the building encroached on their land two and one-half
feet, the complainants filed a bill for a mandatory injunction
to compel the defendants to remove their building. The
defendant, Lodi American Theater Company, was the lessee
of the theater. After this suit was started, the holder of the
mortgage on the theater property foreclosed, and the Lodi
American Theater Company purchased at the foreclosure sale
and now owns the property. Held, complainants are entitled to
a mandatory injunction against the original owners, who erected
the building on a portion of complainant's land, to compel them
to remove the encroachment. Inconvenience to defendants will
not be considered. Cidrona et al. v. Columbus Theater, Inc.
et al., 151 Atl. 467 (N. J. Ch. 1930).
"In a suit of this sort," said the Vice Chancellor in this case,
"the court does not consider the inconvenience or damage
101 People ex rel. Gamber v. Sholem, 294 Ill. 204.
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which may result to the defendants from putting the complain-
ants in possession of their property." This consideration should
be prefaced by the statement that the question of balancing
equities cannot arise except in cases where some sufficient rea-
son for equity jurisdiction exists, such as irreparable injury
or the prevention of multiplicity of suits;102 in other cases, the
injunction will be refused because of adequate legal remedy.' °0
Injunctions against a trespass are sometimes refused because
the hardship, injury, or inconvenience which they would cause
the defendant are out of all proportion to the benefit they would
bring to the plaintiff.104 However, it should also be noted that
merely because inconvenience will arise, the court will not be
induced to withhold preventative relief.10 5 Factors requiring
the considerations of the court are cases where the defendant's
building encroaches but slightly upon the plaintiff's land and
the plaintiff's damage is small, while the cost of removal to the
defendant is great, or where the defendant is engaged in a busi-
ness which serves public convenience, and the defendant can
plead as a reason for not granting the injunction, not only in-
jury to himself but also to the public. 10 In so far as the utility
to the public has been made an argument, it resolves itself upon
the propriety of taking private property for public use without
the requisite condemnation proceedings. 10 7  The courts of
Massachusetts and New York, upon various states of facts, have
considered the question oftener than the courts of any other
jurisdiction, and acting independently, have arrived at much
the same result.' 0 8 The Massachusetts court has summarized
its position as follows: "Where, by an innocent mistake, erec-
tions have been placed a little upon the plaintiff's land, and
the damage caused to the defendant by the removal of them
would be greatly disproportionate to the injury of which the
plaintiff complains, the court will not order their removal, but
102 Wetherell v. Newington, 54 Conn. 67; Rosenberger v. Miller, 61
Mo. App. 422.
05 Nichols v. Sutton & Porter, 22 Ga. 369; Mapes et al. v. Charles
et al., 8 N. Y. Supp. 665; O'Neil v. McKeesport, 201 Pa. 386; Hyatt
v. Bates, 40 N. Y. 164.
104 Robinson v. Clapp, 67 Conn. 538; Scott v. Palms, 48 Mich. 505;
Grey v. Mayor, etc., of City of Paterson, 60 N. J. Eq. 385; Chapin v.
Brown, 15 R. I. 579; Pettibone v. La Crosse & Milwaukee Ry. Co., 14
Wis. 479; Norfolk Southern R. R. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546; Texas
Co. v. United States Asphalt Refining Co. et al., 140 Md. 350; Standard
Chemical & Oil Co. v. Faircloth, 200 Ala. 657.
105 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cunningham, 103 Fed. 708.
106 Fraser v. City of Portland, 81 Ore. 92.
107 Hinchman et al. v. Paterson Horse R. R. Co., 17 N. J. Eq. 75.
10 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (2nd ed.), Vol. II, p. 4361.
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will leave the plaintiff to his remedy at law." 10 9  And New
York summarizes as follows: "It must be remembered that a
willful trespasser cannot in this way acquire an inch of land,
because the mandatory injunction must issue as to him; that
in other- cases where the injury to the plaintiff is irreparable
the mandatory injunction will issue, and permanent damages
will not be awarded; that where the granting of an injunction
would work greater damage to an innocent defendant than the
injury from which the plaintiff prays relief, the injunction
could be refused absolutely, and the plaintiff compelled to seek
his remedy at law."110 Many cases can be found on one extreme
or the other, such as the instaut case, but doubtless the rules of
New York and Massachusetts-and it should be noted that
Illinois follows this trend in its decisions' "-are the best to
follow.
INSURAN CE-DOUBLE INDEMNITY CLAUSE-ELECTROCUTION As
CONSTITUTING AN ACCIDENT.-Suit was brought to recover
$5,000.00 for accidental death of an assured under the double
indemnity clause of a policy of insurance. The contract pro-
vided that the insurer would pay "double the face of this policy
upon receipt of due proof that the death of insured resulted
directly and independently of all other causes from bodily harm
effected solely through external, violent and accidental cause."
The policy further provided: "This double indemnity benefit
will not apply if the insured's death resulted . . . from
any violation of law by the insured. This policy . . . shall
be incontestable after two years from its date of issue except
for non-payment of premiums." Facts produced upon trial
showed that assured met his death by electrocution pursuant to
a conviction for murder and a subsequent sentence that he suf-
fer death in that matter. The plaintiff's declaration merely
set out that certain persons, against the will and intention of
insured, forcibly placed him in a chair, caused him to be
strapped to it, then caused a current of electricity of sufficient
intensity and strength to cause death, to be applied and con-
tinued through the body of insured until he was dead. Over
the objection of the plaintiff's counsel, the court allowed the
defendant to introduce the record, showing the electrocution
109 Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 159 Mass. 306. For other
Massachusetts cases see Tucker v. Howard, 128 Mass. 361; Brande v.
Grace, 154 Mass. 210; Starkie v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188; Lynch v.
Union Institution for Savings, 158 Mass. 394.
110 Goldbacher v. Eggers, 76 N. Y. Supp. 881. For other New York
cases see Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. Supp. 492;
Proskey v. Cumberland Realty Co., 70 N. Y. Supp. 1125.
ii Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Il. 460; Dunn v. Youmans, 224 Ill.
34; Hill v. Kimball, 269 Ill. 398.
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pursuant to sentence imposed by a court of competent juris-
diction. Held, death at the hands of the law was not an acci-
dent within the meaning of the double indemnity clause.
Diamond et at. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 Fed. (2nd) 910
(Dist. Ct. N. D. Ill. 1930).
Since it was obvious that the insured met his death from
bodily injury effected solely through an external and violent
eause, the question for determination was, "Did the death
result from an accidental cause?" The court held that the
insured did not meet his death through accidental cause, since
the evidence showed that he died at the hands of the law under
judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; that his death
was the direct consequence of his intentional, malicious, and
felonious undertaking; that when insured killed his wife he
knew that under the law of Indiana death was a possible result
of his act; that, under the circumstances, he could have reason-
ably anticipated that his death would ensue by reason of the
murder committed; that he intentionally engaged in an under-
taking which might be expected to produce his death; that a
man is presumed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of his voluntary acts. The conclusion is within the
accepted doctrine of accidental death enounced by the courts
in analogous cases. There can be no recovery where claimants
voluntarily and deliberately enter into an undertaking, the
result of which is reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties.11 2  It is further pointed out that the death of the
plaintiff in this case resulted proximately from a violation of
law, this being a risk expressly accepted by the terms of the
double indemnity clause in the contract of insurance. Counsel
for the plaintiff sought to invoke the incontestable clause, but
the court held that the insurer promised to pay the double
indemnity in certain specific contingencies, among which was
the death of the insured should result from "bodily injury
effected through accidental cause;" that the liability of the
insurer arises, under the double indemnity clause only when
and if the facts bring the plaintiff within the terms of the
contract; that the insurer may deny its liability on the ground
that the death of the insured did not occur in a manner whereby
any liability arises. The conclusion reached, in view of the
weight of authority, is obvious, since, "a provision for incon-
testability does not have the effect of converting a promise to
pay on the happening of a stated contingency into a promise
to pay whether such contingency does or does not happen. It
112 Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267; Fidelity and
Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Stacey's Executor, 143 Fed. 271; Taliaferro
v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n., 80 Fed. 368.
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cannot properly be said that a party to an instrument contests
it by raising the question whether under its terms a liability
asserted by another party has or has not accrued." 1 13
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PUBLICATION-DICTATION OF DEFAMA-
TORY LETTER TO STENOGRAPHER AS PUBLICATION.-Motion to
dismiss for insufficiency a complaint wherein it was alleged that
admittedly defamatory matter was dictated by defendant to his
stenographer, who was caused to read and transcribe it. Held,
that the complaint stated a cause of action, based on libel, since
a publication thereof was adequately stated. Ostrowe v. Lee,
244 N. Y. Supp. 28 (New York 1930).
This case, within the confines of its facts, is sustained by the
weight of authority. 114 Yet there are interesting sidelights to
the decision which give rise to several fine distinctions. In the
cases cited in footnote 114 the parties defendant were individuals.
But where there is a corporate defendant, a letter dictated by
an agent thereof to a stenographer employed for that purpose
by the corporation, is not published. 115 This rule is closely con-
fined, for it is not said that there cannot be publication to any
agent of the corporation, but only that there is none by dictation
of a letter to the stenographer," 6 although several decisions
extend the rule, erroneously in the opinion of the writer, to
all agents of the corporation, on the ground that the occasions
were privileged. 117 The rule above stated, where no publication
exists by dictation to the stenographer engaged in the course
of her usual employment, is in direct conflict with some decisions
of considerable merit, u s and even the Court of Appeals of New
113 Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 10 Fed: (2nd)
143. See also Hearin v. Standard Life Ins. Co. et al., 8 Fed. (2nd)
202; Flannagan v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. et al., 22 Fed.
(2nd) 136; Mack v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. of Hartford,
12 Fed. (2nd) 416; Wright v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 25 Fed. (2nd)
514; Scarborough v. American National Insurance Co., 171 N. C. 353;
Childress v. Fraternal Union of America, 113 Tenn. 252; Howard v.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 289 S. W. 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
Scales v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 155 Tenn. 412; Woodbery
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 221 N. Y. Supp. 357; Myers v. Liberty Life Ins.
Co., 124 Kan. 191.
"4Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Newell, Libel & Slander (4th
ed.) 242; Nelson v. Whitten, 272 Fed. 135; Moran v. O'Regan, 38
N. B. 399; Perdon v. Dickens, 161 Ala. 181.
15 Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 53 N. Y. Supp. 1033; Wells v.
Belstrat Hotel Corp., 208 N. Y. Supp. 625; Central of Georgia Ry. Co.
v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 414.
116 Kennedy et al. v. James Butler, Inc., 245 N. Y. 204.
'17 Prins v. Holland N. A. Mtge. Co., 107 Wash. 206; Globe Furniture
Co. v. Wright, 49 App. D. C. 315.
118 Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., 210 Ala. 369; Gambrill v.
Schooley, 93 Md. 48; Pullman v. Hill & Co., Ltd. [1891], 1 Q. B. 524.
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York indicated a doubt as to whether it would uphold the ruling
in Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co.,119 or follow the authorities
to the contrary. 120 There remains the English rule, which dis-
regards the corporation theory and holds in accordance with
the main case 121 and the weight of authority in this country,1 22
but which has been criticized several times in cases where privi-
lege has been confused with publication,123 but which still
remains as authority, 124 inless it be overruled insofar as it holds
the publication that of libel and not of slander.125 Whether the
matter in the main case is libel or whether it is slander is not
discussed, nor does it appear in any of the cases in this country,
though it is recognized and assigned as error in the leading
case on the subject. 1206 No doubt, if this question were squarely
answered, some of the conflict would evaporate, for it inevitably
enters into the background, at least, of the reasoning in the
corporate defendant cases.' 27
NON-RESIDENT CORPORATIONS - JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL
COURTS-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON ATTORNEY As AGENT FOR NON-
RESIDENT CORPORATION.-Suit was brought on a contract between
plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, and defendant, a Virginia
corporation, in the Federal District Court for Massachusetts,
and service of process was obtained upon a Boston attorney who
had appeared as attorney of record for defendant in a previous
suit arising out of this same contract. Provision is made for
service in this manner by a Massachusetts statute 2s and it is
claimed that such process should be held valid and enforced by
the Federal Court under the Conformity Act.129 Held, service
of process upon attorney of non-resident corporation, as pre-
scribed by the Massachusetts statute, insufficient to give Federal
Court jurisdiction. Judgment for plaintiff reversed and dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction. McNeal-Edwards Co. v. Frank
L. Young Co., 42 Fed. (2nd) 362 (Circuit Ct. of App. 1930).
119 32 App. Div. 465, which holds the dictation of a defamatory
letter to stenographer is not publication.
120 Kennedy v. James Butler, Inc., 245 N. Y. 204.
121 Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48.
122 Pullman v. Hill & Co. [18911, 1 Q. B. 524.
123 Boxius v. Goblet Freres 1894], 1 Q. B. 842; Edmondson v. Birch
& Co. [1907], 1 K. B. 371.
124 Moran v. O'Regan, 38 N. B. 399.
125 Angeline v. Anlico, 31 New. Zeal. L. R. 841.
126 Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 48, described as the leading case
in Newell, Libel and Slander (4th ed.), p. 242.
127 Owen v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., 53 N. Y. Supp. 1033; Wells v.
Belstrat Hotel Corp., 208 N. Y. Supp. 625.
128 Gen. Laws Mass., Ch. 227, secs. 1, 2, 3 and 4.
129 U. S. Rev. St., sec. 914.
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The jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States has
been defined and limited by the Acts of Congress and can be
neither restricted nor enlarged by the statutes of a state. 130
Wherever Congress has legislated upon any matter of practice
and prescribed a definite rule for the government of its own
courts, it is to that extent exclusive of the legislation of the
state upon the same matter.13 ' The ultimate determination of
the question of jurisdiction is for the Supreme Court, 1''2 which
has said that "a court of justice cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the-person of one who has no residence within its territorial
jurisdiction except by actual service of notice within the juris-
diction upon him or upon some one authorized to accept ser-
vice in his behalf, or by his waiver, by general appearance or
otherwise, of the want of due service.''1 33 Where service is
attempted to be obtained upon a non-resident corporation
through its duly authorized agent, such service can only be
obtained where the corporation is carrying on business of such
a character and extent within the state as would warrant the
inference that it is present there by its officers authorized to
receive service,134 and in this connection it has been held that
the doing of a single business transaction or even of as many
as four transactions by a non-resident corporation in the state
or district of suit would not be sufficient to warrant this pre-
sumption. 135 A statute which provides that a special appear-
ance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
shall be a waiver of immunity is not binding upon the Federal
Courts.' 36 Similarly, statutory provisions that defendant must
specify his appearance to be made solely for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction,1 37 or that if the purpose for which
such special appearance is entered is not sanctioned or sus-
tained by the court a general appearance shall be entered, and
a failure to consent to the entrance of such general appearance
shall be treated as a general appearance,138 or that return of
service by the sheriff shall be conclusive on the parties as regards
130 Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Pink-
ney, 149 U. S. 194; Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202.
131 Ex Parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713.
132Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437.
133 Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518.
134 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Alexander, 227 U. S.
218.
135Rosenberg Bros. & Co. Inc. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516;
Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573.
136 Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194; Southern Pacific
Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202.
137 Wabash Western Ry. Co. v. Brow, 164 U. S. 271.
138Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson, 213
U. S. 10.
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jurisdiction, 13 9 have all been declared to be not binding on the
Federal Courts and in one instance to be contrary to the laws
of the United States and invalid. 140  The doctrine in these
cases is clear, and well expressed by the court in Wabash West-
ern Railway Co. v. Brow,'4 where it is held that "an acknowl-
edged right cannot be forfeited by pursuit of the means the
law affords of asserting that right."
139 Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437.
140 Davidson Bros. Marble Co. v. United States ex rel. Gibson, 213
U. S. 10.
141 164 U. S. 271.
